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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD CHAD NELSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930543-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992), and Utah R. Crim. 
P. 26(2)(a), whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action 
may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and 
conviction for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony, 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
When the State showed only that there was an unlawful entry 
into private premises and the jury's verdict of acquittal on a theft 
charge reflected that appellant never touched the stolen items, was 
the evidence insufficient for a burglary conviction? 
"A jury conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence 
only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted." State v. Salas# 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted); State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 483 (Utah 1989) 
("A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot 
stand"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 23, 1993, a jury found Donald C. Nelson "not 
guilty" of Theft, a class A misdemeanor. (R 93). The same jury, 
however, convicted him of burglary, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202, in the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Tyrone E. Medley, presiding. 
Following a continuance and a 90 day evaluation, 
(R 95-103), the trial court ordered Mr. Nelson to serve an 
indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State Prison, 
together with various court-ordered amounts. (R 105). Commitment 
issued forthwith. (R 105) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 31, 1992, Donald Nelson and Renee Willson were 
in their apartment at 50 North "D" Street. (R 304) (apartment 3). 
They had been entertaining some friends for most of the day, 
including other tenants in the same apartment complex. (R 295, 314). 
One tenant in the same small twelve unit complex, Michael 
Nyer, had not been invited to Nelson's New Year's Day party. 
(R 295). Nyer was alone all of New Year's Eve. (R 251). He lived 
in apartment 5, a neighboring unit whose wall Nelson used for a dart 
game. (R 310). Darts were thrown at a target on Nyer's wall. 
(R 310). 
Nelson and Nyer did not speak regularly to each another, 
although Nyer had expressed resentment at Nelson for playing darts 
late at night. (R 310) . Nyer told Nelson the game was noisy and 
"tossed" his darts. (R 247) . Don recalled that Nyer "said 
something underneath his breath and slammed his door." (R 310). 
Nyer also had complained to the apartment landlord about the dart 
playing. The landlord in turn set a 10:00 p.m. curfew for the 
game. (R 312). 
At approximately 10:00 p.m., New Year's Eve, Don and Renee 
were celebrating the coming of the New Year by playing cards with 
their friends and throwing darts in the hallway. (R 295). An hour 
later, Nelson's friends left for other festivities while Don and 
Renee remained at home. (R 305). 
Shortly after midnight on January 1, 1993, Don called his 
relatives to wish them a Happy New Year's. (R 296). After the 
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phone call, Renee was . . . doing dishes [when] Donald stepped in 
the kitchen to discuss something . . . " (R 296, 305). The two "got 
in an argument" about Renee's cousin. (R 305). They sat down and 
talked awhile, with Don making them something to eat, but the 
squabbling continued into the bedroom. (R 305). Renee went to 
sleep at about 2:35 a.m., after they had "made up." (R 297, 305). 
Don never left their bedroom. (R 297, 300). 
During that same period of time, Denise Robison's apartment 
was burglarized. (R 272). Denise's unit, apartment 6, was only 
four to six feet away from apartment 5, Michael Nyer's residence. 
(R 235, 239, 267). Shifting attention away from himself, Nyer 
suggested that Don, Renee, and their dart playing friends were 
involved in the burglary. (R 260, 264). Nyer eventually admitted, 
however, that he had no basis to believe that Don's friends were 
involved other than that they "hung out together" and "associated 
with one another." (R 261-62). 
At 1:15 a.m., New Year's Day, Denise Robison left her 
apartment to go to a party. Denise's compact disc player and her 
roommate's portable stereo were still inside the apartment. 
(R 269). The portable stereo was 2 and 1/2 feet long and 1 and 1/2 
feet tall. (R 283). The bulky items could not be concealed. 
According to Michael Nyer, at 1:30 a.m. he awoke to "a 
crackling, crunching-type of sound". (R 233). The noise Nyer heard 
was a back door opening, "[i]t is a light-weight noisy door that 
crunches open and crunches closed." (R 236). Nyer went to his 
bathroom and "saw the defendant standing at the window of apartment 
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No. 6 opposite of me." (R 234). Nyer watched Nelson until "he went 
back in the back door." (R 236). When Nelson departed, Nyer 
returned to bed. (R 236). Nyer testified that he was not alarmed 
"and I didn't really feel that, you know, that this was unauthorized 
entry." (R 243). 
Nyer heard "more crunching ice noise". "[T]he defendant 
was again at the window doing something. I [Nyer] could not see 
what." (R 236). Nyer went to his front door and looked through his 
peephole. (R 236). He saw Nelson leave the apartment although 
again there was nothing in his hands. (R 238, 255-56). Nyer went 
to bed a second time. (R 238). 
At no time did Nyer observe Nelson carrying anything out of 
the apartment. (R 241). Nyer first awoke around 1:30 a.m. and 
thought that the entire sequence of events lasted 20-30 minutes. 
(R 232, 242). 
When Denise Robison returned to her apartment, she 
immediately realized that she had been burglarized. (R 270). She 
called the police. Denise's CD player and her roommate's portable 
stereo were reported missing. (R 270). There also was a broken 
window, although Nyer was unaware of that fact until the next day. 
(R 264). 
On New Year's Day, Nyer approached Denise and claimed that 
he knew what happened. (R 273). He blamed Don and gave a statement 
to the police. (R 245). The investigating officers relied entirely 
on Nyer's account. (R 290). The officers did not "dust" Denise's 
apartment for fingerprints and they found no useable physical 
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evidence from the broken window. (R 288, 290). They did not search 
Nyer's apartment. 
The officers went to question Nelson. They asked to search 
Don and Renee's apartment and received their immediate consent. 
(R 298, 308). Although the police uncovered nothing from the 
search, they decided to arrest Don anyway based on Nyer's 
statements. (R 308). 
At trial, the jury acquitted Don of theft. (R 93). They 
did not believe that he had "obtained or exercised unauthorized 
control over" the CD player or the portable stereo. (R 78). 
Following the trial court's denial of Mr. Nelson's motion to amend 
the burglary charge with criminal trespass, (R 317), the jury was 
allowed to convict him of burglary. (R 92). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft charge 
reflected their belief that Don Nelson never obtained or exercised 
unauthorized control over the stolen items. While the State's 
evidence established an unlawful entry, the surrounding 
circumstances and the jury's "not guilty" verdict on the theft 
charge suggested nothing more than a reckless intent. The burglary 
conviction should be vacated with criminal trepass entered in its 
place. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT PREVENTED THE JURY FROM 
CONSIDERING THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL TRESPASS INSTEAD OF 
BURGLARY 
"The mere unlawful entry into private premises may not 
alone support a finding of intent." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 
117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). This supreme court holding applies 
directly to Mr. Nelson's case. 
At the outset, Mr. Nelson concedes that the State's 
evidence established an unlawful entry, the first element of a 
burglary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202. This evidence in and of 
itself, however, does not support a finding of criminal intent. 
Id. Even when the marshalled facts and inconsistencies are viewed 
in a favorable light, the prosecution's case-in-chief still failed 
to the intent required for burglary. 
Michael Nyer, a tenant in apartment 5, claimed that he 
twice saw Don Nelson in Denise Robison's apartment on January 1, 
1993. (R 233-56). Denise's apartment doors were locked and any 
entry would have been unauthorized. (R 270, 277). By contrast, Don 
Nelson and Renee Willson both testified that they had been arguing 
in their apartment during the time in question. (R 296, 305). 
Nevertheless, appellant assumes, arguendo, that the jury 
disregarded his alibi. He assumes that the discrepancies in time 
were of no consequence. Compare (R 232, 242) (Nyer awoke at 1:30 
a.m. and testified that his observations and the entire sequence of 
events last 20-30 minutes), with (R 297, 305) (until at least 2:35 
a.m., Don was with Renee). He also assumes that Nyer's 
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identification of an intruder dressed in a dark shirt, dark gray 
sweat pants, and "brand new, fancy, high-tech" high top shoes could 
be reconciled in a light favorable to the white washed pants and old 
tennis shoes worn by Don. Compare (R 252-53), with (R 299, 306-07). 
Other nonfactors for the jury included Michael Nyer's 
exclusion from Nelson's party and his feelings of resentment for the 
dart throwing. (R 295, 310). Ignored were Nyer's own ability to 
access Denise's next door apartment and his unsolicited 
"finger-pointing" of Don. (R 259, 273). Once the blame had been 
directed at Don Nelson, the police never attempted to search Nyer's 
apartment. (R 259). 
Notwithstanding all of these shortcomings, Michael Nyer's 
identification only established that Don Nelson had unlawfully 
entered into apartment 6 without Ms. Robison's permission. State v. 
Pitts, 728 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), lends guidance in 
this regard. 
In Pitts, the defendant entered a convenience store which 
had just received "a dark yellow bank envelope containing its bank 
statement and cancelled checks." Id. at 114. The envelope was left 
in the back corner of the office in an area not open to the public. 
Id. When defendant Pitts exited the store, he "returned to [his] 
car [with] a dark yellow envelope similar in appearance to the 
store's bank envelope delivered that morning. [A passenger] 
inquired [about] the envelope, and defendant told her that the 
envelope contained checks, but 'they weren't for him, somebody else 
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could use them.7" Id. at 115. Pitts then went to a friend's house 
where he maintained careful possession of the envelope. Id. 
Police eventually found the envelope in defendant Pitts' 
car. Four blank checks from the store were "missing and were later 
rejected by the bank when their forged negotiation was attempted." 
728 P.2d at 115. Pitts did not testify at [his burglary] trial." 
Id. 
Following his conviction, the supreme court affirmed on 
appeal, concluding: 
The mere unlawful entry into private premises may 
not alone support a finding of intent. But 
defendant's unexplained possession of another's 
property, his subsequent statements and conduct, and 
other unrebutted evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances also support the reasonable inference 
that defendant entered or remained in the office with 
the specific intent to commit theft. 
Pitts, 728 P.2d at 117 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, however, Donald Nelson never possessed 
another's property, nor were there any suspicious statements or 
conduct. The surrounding circumstances did not support a reasonable 
inference of the specific intent to commit a theft. Don and Renee 
freely consented to the investigating officers search of their 
apartment. (R 298, 308). They both explained that at the time in 
question they were in the kitchen, they were in an argument, and 
they were in the bedroom. (R 296, 297, 300, 305). Even if Don's 
alibi was discounted, Michael Nyer's own account still proved only 
an unlawfully entry. 
- 9 -
Nyer admitted that when he saw Nelson in the bathroom—with 
the lights on and the Venetian blinds open—Don did not look like he 
was trying to hide anything. (R 256). Indeed, the portable stereo 
(measuring 2 and 1/2 feet long by 1 and 1/2 feet tall) would have 
been impossible to hide. (R 283-84). In each of Nyer's claimed 
sightings—from the bathroom window to the front door peephole—Don 
was observed with nothing. (R 241). If Nelson did enter the 
apartment, at no time during the entire 20 to 30 minute sequence of 
events in which the sightings took place did the State prove that 
Nelson had even touched the portable stereo or the compact disc 
stereo system. (R 238, 241, 255-56). If Nelson had been in the 
apartment, he left empty-handed. (R 255-56). 
The jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft charge further 
reflects that Don did not "obtain or exercise unauthorized control 
over11 the portable stereo or the CD player. (R 78) . The jury 
believed that Don never handled the items for even the slightest 
moment since the briefest handling of them would have constituted 
"exercis[ing] unauthorized control over" another's property. 
(R 78). Somebody else—a person who possessed the requisite 
intent—had removed the property from the premises. 
While the circumstances in Pitts need not duplicate those 
in the present case, see 728 P.2d at 117, the complete lack of Pitt 
circumstances here and the jury's verdict of acquittal on the theft 
charge leaves the State with a "mere unlawful entry into private 
premises." Such evidence "may not alone support a finding of 
intent." Id. 
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However, as suggested by defense counsel below, the 
evidence was arguably enough for criminal trespass. (R 317). Under 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii), "[a] person is guilty of 
criminal trespass if, under circumstances not amounting to burglary 
. . . [h]e enters or remains unlawfully on property and . . . [i]s 
reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety 
of another." Id. The more culpable intent required for burglary 
would not be needed for criminal trespass; the lesser offense only 
requires "recklessness" and an unlawful entry. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-206(2)(a)(iii). 
The evidence was insufficient to support a burglary 
conviction. Mr. Nelson's conviction should be set aside with 
criminal trespass entered in its place. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-1-402(5) (if "an appellate court on appeal . . . shall 
determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a 
conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the 
trier of fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction 
of that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may 
be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense. . . " ) . 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
burglary conviction and enter criminal trespass in its place. 
SUBMITTED this /6D day of December, 1993. 
Z.l / 
. FUJI RONAILD S  NO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
episode — Included offenses. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evi-
de^e to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is suffi-
dent evidence to support a conviction for an ^ ^ < ^ ^ ^ ^ $ 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included of-
fense the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
[ S e n t of conviction Stered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
76-6-202. Burglary. 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
76-6-206. Criminal trespass. 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on property and: 
(i) Intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person thereon or 
damage to any property thereon; or 
(ii) Intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; 
(iii) Is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the 
safety of another. 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on 
property as to which notice against entering is given by: 
(i) Personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone 
with apparent authority to act for the owner; or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude in-
truders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor. A viola-
tion of Subsection (2Kb) is an infraction. 
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section: 
(a) That the property was open to the public when the actor entered or 
remained; and 
(b) The actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's 
